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The world  aerospace  industry  is  undergoing dramatic  changes.  Momentous  recent  events 
such as the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and the proposed merger of Lockheed 
Martin and Northrop Grumman have been driven by  a recognition that the structure of the 
industry  will  only  allow  for  a  small  number of world-class  prime  contractors  to  sustain 
competitiveness and commercial success through  the  integration of capabilities  in  a  broad 
range of inter-related aerospace disciplines.  In the light of these events, this Communication 
sets out to assess the situation of the European aerospace industry as a whole focusing on a 
range of possible scenarios tor its future development. 
•  Markets 
In  terms of large civil aircraft the Airbus share of the market grew steadily throughout the 
1980's, as its aircraft range  increas~d, but has remained essentially stable since 1989 and its 
share  of the  backlog  stood  at  around  30%  in  1996.  Boeing's  market  share  decreased 
somewhat in  1989 but grew again over the past few years to around 64% in  1996,  whilst the 
McDonnell  Douglas  share  of the  civil  aircraft  market  has  been  consistently  decreasing 
throughout the  1980's and 90's to around 6% in  1996.  Since the acquisition of McDonnell 
Douglas by  Boeing, the  European aerospace  industry  faces  one dominant competitor with 
around 70% of  the total order backlog. 
While  the  market  for  civil  aerospace  products  is  clearly  a  world-wide  market,  military 
aerospace  markets  are  constrained  by  differing  national  defence  and  procurement 
regulations.  An illustration of recent market shares on the open international market can be 
provided by looking at the fighter aircraft contracts awarded between 1992 and 1996, where it 
is believed that in terms of  value 15-20% went to  European producers while nearly 80% went 
to US producers. 
In the world civil helicopter market the European share decreased throughout the  1980s but 
has stabilised in the  1990s and in  1996 stood at  around 28% (unit deliveries of EU-design 
origin helicopters),  whilst in the  military  helicopter market the  European share has  been 
constantly decreasing, particularly after the end of the cold war and now stands at around 8% 
of  the world market. 
In regional aircraft (jet and turboprop), where the number of manufacturers is far greater but 
has been diminishing over the years, European companies held a majority share of the market 
for a long time (over 70% in  1994).  More recently, however, rapidly increasing competition 
from Canadian, Brazilian and Asian producers combined with the collapse of Fokker and the 
sale of Dornier to  Fairchild has  resulted in  a dramatic reduction in  European market share 
whilst the Canadian industry now holds 40% of  the regional jet market. 
The position of the  European industry in  the  world space markets varies between a market 
share  of 5%  or  less  in  some  categories  of ground  equipment,  20-25%  in  the  satellite 
manufacturing sector and more than 50% in  space launch services as a result of the  Ariane 
programme, albeit only in markets which are effectively open to competition. 
In  the  civil  aeroengine  market  the  level  of co-operation  between  US  and  European 
companies  is  greater than  within  Europe  (e.g.  Snecma and  GE  produce the  CFM  engine, 
whilst MTU of Germany participates in Pratt and Whitney engines) however intra-European 
co-operation is the norm for  military aeroengines such as Eurojet.  Because of these levels 
of EU-US co-operation it is difficult to compare market shares.  However, the turnover of the 
two largest US aeroengine producers is roughly double that of  the two major EU producers. The equipment sector is growing in importance and complexity (it represents an ever greater 
part of  an aerospace system's value and 30% of  the total employment in the aerospace sector) 
but without successful European platforms its long term future would be compromised. 
II.  FACING THE CHALLENGE 
Despite enormous and painful efforts over the last 10 years, the European aerospace industry 
suffers  from  the  increasingly  acute  effects  of the  continued  partitioning  of its  industrial 
structures.  Previous Communications have addressed issues relating to different areas of the 
aerospace  industry  1•  By  now  taking  a  global  approach  to  this  industry  three  factors  are 
apparent from the current situation: 
•  The  ever greater complexity of aerospace  products  has  led  to  spiralling development 
costs and financial  risks which have  long outstripped the resources of even the  largest 
European companies and have led to ever fewer new programmes being launched. 
•  No single Member State can come close to matching the large home market for defence 
equipment or the level of RTD support provided to  the  US  industry.  National markets 
can  no  longer  provide  a  sufficiently  strong  base  to  support  a  full-range  independent 
aerospace activity. 
•  Few individual firms in Europe have been able to  balance risks and maximise benefits 
from developing activities in a broad range of  aerospace businesses.  Those that have are 
too  small  to  enjoy  the  economies  of scale  of the  US  mega-companies  which  now 
dominate the business. 
It is apparent that any further delay in responding to the changes which have taken place in 
the aerospace market will jeopardise the  future of the European aerospace industry and the 
hundreds of thousands of  jobs it provides. 
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1.  US Strategy 
By  far the  largest competitor on the  world aerospace market is the  US  industry  with up to 
58% of the world aerospace business (in terms of consolidated turnover) while the EU stands 
1 "The European Aircraft Industry:  First assessment and possible Community actions", (COM(92) 164  Final) -
'The challenges  facing  the  European  defence-related  industry,  a  contribution  for  action  at  European  level" 
(COM(96)  I  0  Final)  - "The  European  Union  and  Space:  Fostering  applications,  markets  and  industrial 
competitiveness" (COM(96) 617 Final) at 29%.  The US  is the market leader in  both civil and military aerospace and has a highly 
developed administrative structure to support its position. 
The recent history of  the US aerospace industry has been one of  consolidation.  From over 20 
companies involved in the design or production of aerospace systems in  1980 the industry is 
now concentrated in the hands of three prime suppliers: Boeing, Lockheed Martin (which has 
recently announced plans to  merge with Northrop Grumman) and Raytheon.  Of these three 
companies, only the first produces large civil aircraft, and only the first two military aircraft. 
However, all are active across a wide range of aerospace activities in order to  balance their 
risks, increase their ability to cope with market cycles and take full  advantage of technology 
and skill transfers between the different sectors. 
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This  consolidation  process  has  been  facilitated  by  US  government's  stated  policy  to 
"maintain the superiority" of US  aerospace and ensure that federal  investments are focused 
and effective to strengthen the public-private partnership to promote continued US  leadership 
in  aerospace and aviation through a clearly set out national aerospace policy to  support its 
industry. 
•  Research and Development 
The  US  government  invests  massively  in  both  civil  and  military  aerospace  research  and 
technological development.  On  the  civil  side,  the  Federal  Aviation Administration has an 
annual aeronautics  budget for  R&D  which exceeds $2  billion.  Moreover,  in civil aircraft 
alone, according to estimates carried out for the EU, about 70% of  NASA's annual $1  billion 
aeronautics spending can be  classified as  support to  the  US  large  civil  aircraft  industry or 
ll  - I:.:, 
l.:~anm  :  .. I around  four  times  the  total  large  civil  aircraft  RTD  support  provided  by  the  EU  and  its 
Member States combined 
Whilst support for military aerospace is difficult to estimate accurately since much of it  falls 
into the so-called "black budget", publicly available Department of Defense figures show that 
its aerospace research, development, test and evaluation budget averages $20 billion per year. 
This  investment  has  strengthened  the  technology  base  upon  which  the  industry  relics  to 
develop both military and civil products 
Moreover a strong emphasis has emerged in the US  on a number of well-funded and highly 
co-ordinated  or  programme-specific  technology  acquisition  projects  many  of which  have 
dual-use applications such as the High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) and  Integrated  High 
Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET) projects. 
•  Civil/military 
Contrary to  the situation in  Europe, the promotion of a dual-use approach has been a major 
element in  liS research and procurement policies for  many years now and is  leading to an 
increasingly  integrated  defence-civil  technology  and  industrial  base.  The  promotion  of 
technological  synergy  between  civil  and  defence  activities  optimise's  the  use  of  RTD 
resources and encourages the restructuring and consolidation of the industry.  For example, 
on the industrial side it is doubtful if a commercial space industry could ever have come into 
being  without  the  benefit  of  defence  programmes  as  a  springboard  for  commercial 
applications.  Conversely, the military sector can also benefit from civil technology standards 
and practices as can be seen in the field of transport aircraft. 
•  Single regulatory framework and market 
The  US  industry  obviously  henetits  greatly  from  being  heavily  supported  by  one  single 
government while the  European aerospace market remains  fragmented  because of national 
boundaries  and  separate  research  and  defence  policies.  European  undertakings  such  as 
Airbus,  Eurocopter,  Eurotighter or  Arianespace  must  address  themselves  to  a  number of 
different governments with all too often differing priorities. 
The US  Aerospace industry also benefits from  the fact that US  government procurement has 
mostly  been  directed  at  US  companies  and  at  ensuring  the  continued  wcll-heing  and 
supremacy  of the  US  industry.  In  addition  tht:  amount  dedicated  to  military  equipment 
procurement (including RTD) in  the lJS is,  at around $80 billion per annum, almost double 
the  combined military equipment procurement and  RTD  budgets of EU  countries.  Within 
these figures, the amounts dedicated exclusively to military RTD represents annually at least 
$35  billion  in  the  US  versus  $12  billion in  Europe.  Such significant differences  in  RTD 
spending risks marginalising the European technology base. 
Similarly,  NASA's  spac~: budget  ($12  billion  in  1995) combined with the  Department of 
Defense space budget ($1 0 billion in  1995) is about ten times that of Europe's space budgets. 
•  Advocacy Center 
Consolidating the  lJS  policy of lobbying on behalf of US  companies, the Advocacy Center 
was established within the Department of Commerce.  The Center is  at the core of the  lJS 
national  export  strategy  and  works  in  co-ordination  with  the  19  tederal  agencies  of the 
congressionally  mandated  Trade  Promotion  Co-ordinating  Committee  (which  include  the 
Department of State, the Export Import Bank, and the Department of Defence).  The aim of 
the Advocacy Center is to expand l JS  exports and assist US government personneL including 
US  embassy  personnel,  in  approaching  foreign  governments on  behalf of l JS  commercial interests.  By doing so the Advocacy Center fulfils its stated aim of pursuing deals on behalf 
of US companies from start to finish through "hands-on" support. 
Although  the  Center  is  not  an  aerospace-specific  facility,  in  the  increasingly  global  and 
competitive  aerospace  market  it  has  been  proving  widely  beneficial  to  US  aerospace 
companies and the Advocacy Center is vocal in highlighting its contribution to the sale of  US 
built aircraft. 
2  Sjtuatjon jn other countries 
The  Canadian aerospace  industry  (the  bulk  of which  has  been  brought  into  one  single 
company by Bombardier) is strongly supported by both Federal and provincial governments, 
and  is  extremely  active  in  the  regional  aircraft  market  with  both  aircraft  and  engine 
production.  Bombardier's share of  the world regional aircraft market was up to 40% in 1996 
and is likely to increase further with the demise of Fokker and the recent successful launch of 
the new Canadair 70 seat jet. 
The aerospace industry in the ex-USSR was long one of  the largest producers in the world, it 
has however, been hard hit by the post-1989 events and is currently struggling and having to 
downscale massively.  The CIS aerospace industry, apart from the space launcher segment, is 
thus  not currently  a major competitor on the  world market but could in a relatively  short 
period of time  become an active player in  both civil and military aerospace if appropriate 
financial and restructuring steps are taken.  Indeed signs of a re-emergence are beginning to 
appear,  in  particular through competitive offers  in  export markets for  combat aircraft and 
missiles. 
While  the  Japanese industry  has  designed and  produced its own aircraft,  spacecraft and 
launchers,  its  has  developed  a  role  as  high  tech  subcontractor to  foreign  (essentially  US) 
aerospace companies. 
China's aircraft industry is  still  in its early stages,  however the Chinese together with the 
Singapore  aerospace  industry  entered  an  important  agreement  earlier  this  year  to  jointly 
produce a 1  00-seater aircraft with Airbus and Alenia.  In the space field,  China is pursuing a 
policy aimed at becoming one of the world's foremost launch providers and also has strong 
aspirations in the satellite field. 
Embraer of Brazil produces regional aircraft (with 10% of  the world regional aircraft market) 
and is  involved in a number of minor military aerospace co-operations.  Indonesia is also a 
competitor  in  the  regional  aircraft  market,  and  from  producing  small  turboprops  in  co-
operation with other companies, it will now launch its own N250 turboprop regional aircraft. 
3  EU fra2mentatjon 
In comparison with the US, the pace of consolidation in Europe has been dramatically slow. 
With much smaller home markets and overall shares than their American counterparts, there 
are still 6 civil aircraft producers (1  in the US), 6 combat aircraft companies (2 in the US), 3 
helicopter manufacturers (3  in the  US),  12  missile producers (  4 in the US), at least 6 major 
producers of defence electronics (  4 in the US) and 5 satellite prime contractors (  4 in the US) 
in Europe. 
5 •  Industry structure 
Very few  European companies have the scale and  the range of interdependent activities of 
their US  competitors.  Even the  largest European aerospace companies,  British Aerospace, 
Aerospatiale and Daimler-Benz Aerospace, are only between one-quarter and one-fifth of  the 
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The period of sustained development which was enjoyed by the European aerospace industry 
in  the  1970's and  80's was  badly dented  in  the  early  1990's,  firstly  because of the  fall  in 
defence-related activity following the end of the cold war and secondly because of the slump 
in civil orders which accompanied the massive losses experienced by the airline industry in 
the first four years of  the decade in the aftermath ofthe Gulf War. 
These difficulties served to highlight the fact that the European aerospace industry still has to 
cope with structural adjustment problems.  In recent years, the European aerospace industry 
has  lost ground to  that of the  restructured and  revitalised US  industry and in certain niche 
markets it is facing increasing competition from third countries' manufacturers. 
In  defence-related  aerospace  where  Europe  is  handicapped  by  small,  partitioned  home 
markets, exports are crucial to  the health of the European aerospace industry.  Yet it  is  now 
exporting less than half as much as the US industry as the latter's export performance, thanks 
also to the political influence exercised on its behalf, started to benefit under the increasingly 
stable international political conditions of  the current decade. 
•  National focus 
Historically,  Member  States  have  viewed  aerospace  as  a  national  industry,  primarily  for 
reasons  of national  security.  This  means  that  policies  affecting  this  industry  have  been 
pursued  with  a  national  focus.  National  research  policies,  procurement  decisions  and 
decisions  on  direct  support  have  been  measured  solely  in  terms  of their  impact  on  the 
"domestic" industry.  Even the regulatory framework in terms of product certification, export credits, company law and so  forth  is  either non-existent or under-developed at a European 
level. 
An  exception  to  this  national  focus  of the  aerospace  industry  arises  in  the  numerous 
collaborations within the  Community's Research  Framework Programmes where  for  many 
years now, the aerospace industry has  participated along with research centres in pursuit of 
transnational goals and objectives.  The Commission proposes to reinforce these efforts in the 
5th Framework Programme. 
However Europe spends much less than the US on RTD support and despite the transnational 
collaboration in Community R  TD programmes, the difference is accentuated by the still very 
important  duplication  of spending  by  different  Member  States  in  pursuit  of "national" 
aerospace  objectives.  Thus  the  objective  of maintaining capabilities  and  competitiveness 
compared  to  other  aerospace  industries  inside  Europe  is  undermining  the  position of the 
European industry as a whole. 
4.  Importance of  the Aerospace industn for Europe 
This situation  is  all  the  more  critical  given the  huge  potential of the  European aerospace 
industry which employs over 3  70 000 people directly and many times that number indirectly; 
and  creates  high  quality jobs as  well  as  critical  and  pervasive  technologies  that  fuel  the 
development of many other industries.  The aerospace industry sustains the capability for an 
independent defence and it involves some 700 firms (many ofthem SMEs) with an estimated 
70 000 suppliers operating in all Member States in the Union. 
Estimated r:U Aerospace turnover breakdown 
by final system level (source: AECMA) 
•  Trade and Competition: 
The European aerospace industry  is  a 
diverse  industry  which  produces 
complete  systems  covering  all 
aerospace  applications:  large  civil jet 
aircraft,  regional  aircraft  (jets  and 
turboprops),  military  aircraft, 
helicopters,  missiles,  satellites  and 
launchers,  as  well  as  engines  and 
equipment.  The  chart  illustrates  the 
estimated distribution of the turnover. 
The significance of a strong Aerospace 
industry  for  Europe  as  a  whole  is 
manifest not only because it is  one of 
the  top  15  industrial  sectors  by 
employment, but also because: 
In  1996  the  value  of aerospace exports  was  put at  over  15  billion  ECU  which  represents 
almost 3% of total EU exports.  Although EU aerospace exports and imports have remained 
broadly in balance over the last  I 0 years, Europe has consistently been a major net importer 
of aerospace products from the United States.  It should also be remembered that in a market 
such as large civil aircraft (estimated to be  worth around 1 000 billion ECU over the next 20 
years) it is only the existence of the European aerospace industry's products that prevents the 
current dominance of Boeing from becoming an absolute monopoly. 
7 •  Independent defence capability: 
The aerospace  industry  accounts  for  approximately  50%  of the  defence-related  industries 
(including electronics tor aerospace).  Without the ability to develop and produce efficiently 
the necessary aerospace products, autonomy  in  the  tonnulation of an  independent defence 
policy  would  be  significantly  diminished.  There  are  thus  important  foreign  and  security 
policy considerations in the maintenance of a healthy and competitive aerospace industry. 
•  Technology transfer to other sectors: 
With around  15% of its  turnover spent  on  Research  and  Technological  Development,  the 
aerospace sector is among the most research intensive sectors of the economy.  It  is not only 
strategic in  itself hut is also a driver tor the development of a wide variety of technologies 
which are critical tor innovation in other industries.  It stimulates technological development 
in high-tech supplier industries (e.g.  materials and electronics) and  plays a  leading  role  in 
technological  innovations  which diffuse  to  other sectors  (e.g.  energy  and automotive).  A 
weakening of  the technological dynamism of the aerospace sector would therefore undermine 
European innovation and competitiveness much beyond tht: sector itself 
•  Space applications: 
Satellites,  it  is  now  recognised,  will  bL~  fundamental  in  bringing  the  opportumt1es  of the 
global  information  society  to  many  parts  of the  world2,  complementing  and  replacing 
terrestrial  infrastructure.  Global satellite navigation is  also becoming a cornerstone of civil 
transport systems and other applications (in  the same way as  it  has already become for  the 
majority of defence  systems) and  the  L\1  is  currently  reliant on  US  and  Russian  military-
based systems. 
•  The air transport system 
The public demand for air transport is growing at around 5% per year. The aerospace industry 
has to meet this demand  not only with new aircraft but also with associated air traftic control 
and avionics systems which will enhance the efficiency and satety of  operations 
•  The Environment 
The European aerospace industry has made considerable progress in  developing quieter and 
cleaner aircraft.  However the  continuing  rapid  growth of air  transport and the  increasing 
importance of environmental aspects ti.u  competitiveness, means that these efforts will  have 
to be enhanced in future so as to meet both local and global concerns.  Local as in  the case of 
noise  annoyance  around  airports,  or  regulation  on  access  to  individual  airports  based  on 
environmental targets.  Global as in  the case of the debate on climate change and greenhouse 
gases, such as C02 and NOx.  Measures, at  a global or I~C level, need to  be taken to  control 
the environmental impact of air transport in  terms of noise and gaseous emissions, including 
support for  further substantial  investment in  environmentally  related  RTD  by  the  European 
aerospace industry. 
III.  SCENARIOS FOR THE FlJTlJRF. 
An efficient, strong European industry should not be seen in  opposition to  the  US  industry, 
but as complementary to the US  industry in  the global market.  If Europe wishes to  be a real 
partner for  the US  with  American companies participating in  European programmes in  the..! 
2 See the rel:ent Commission Communil:atwn "Ell action plan: Satellite Communications in  the lnfonnation 
Society" European Commissiun(97)':1 I final 
X same  way  as  European  companies  partlctpate  in  American  programmes,  the  European 
aerospace industry must be able to compete in terms of financial and technological resources 
as well as with attractive, commercial programmes.  It is in the interest of  the whole European 
Union and of  customers from all countries, that the European aerospace industry should be a 
credible counterweight to the very real threat of  a US monopoly in the aerospace business. 
The particularities of the aerospace market determihe to  a very great extent the nature of the 
required  response.  The production and sale of aerospace products are  marked by  massive 
entry  barriers, huge costs of programme development with commensurately  long pay-back 
periods and ever greater technological complexity, but above all by increasing returns to scale 
and  important benefits  of scope.  There  are  few  if any,  other  industries  where  size  is  as 
important as  it is  in aerospace.  Large civil aircraft tor example require a production run of 
several  hundred  just  to  break  even  and  it  has  been  estimated  that  every  doubling  of 
production reduces costs by around 20%. 
It is  not the Commission's intention to propose, ml}ch less decide, the eventual shape of the 
European  aerospace  industry  - such  decisions  should  only  be  taken  on  commercial  and 
economic grounds by  those with a direct stake in the success or failure of the venture whilst 
respecting the Community policies on competition and other relevant areas.  Nevertheless the 
Commission can outline the scenarios facing the  industry and attempt to  gauge them against 
the broader European interest. 
1  National Solutions 
One scenario would entail maintaining the current system of  one or more aerospace industries 
separately in each Member State.  Of course there are already a number of cross-border joint-
ventures  and  alliances,  but sustaining  such  a network of national  champions would  mean 
continuing with companies which are  too  small  to  enjoy the economies of scale of the  US 
mega-companies.  National markets can no  longer provide a strong enough base for  a full-
range aerospace activity, and growing development costs of the aerospace industry have long 
surpassed the resources of  even the largest European companies. 
Within  Europe the industry in certain Member States has come to  appreciate the benefits of 
size and has gone through a process of consolidation on a national level.  An example is the 
aerospace industry in  Italy which through the  1970s and  1980s consolidated into one major 
aerospace  group,  Alenia,  which  is  active  in  civil  aircraft,  airframe  components,  military 
aircraft and  space applications.  Alenia's  parent company,  Finrneccanica,  also  includes  the 
helicopter producer Augusta.  On the other hand the industry in some other Member States is 
still fragmented even at a national level.  The short term advantages of national groupings  are 
open to debate, but this lack of coherence in the different Member States only accentuates the 
differences and partitionings of the European aerospace industry. 
Most analysts concur that maintaining isolated national companies is  not a viable option for 
the future.  There is an urgent need for increased cross-border business and progress towards 
the  creation  of a  European  defence  procurement  regime  so  as  to  overcome  the  problems 
arising  from  the  current  fragmentation.  Even  where  there  is  agreement on the  need  for 
transnational  integration, the companies and their shareholders must recognise that the pace 
of restructuring  is  too  slow and  acknowledge  that  another difference  between  the  various 
aerospace companies in Europe is the ownership structure. 
Any  restructuring requires agreement between companies who  have  to  take due account of 
their shareholders' interests as well as the commercial environment in which they operate.  In 
the  European  aerospace  industry  we  are  currently  faced  with  three  main  types  of 
9 shareholding  structure:  private  and  dispersed.  private  and  concentrated,  and  public  and 
concentrated.  However, certain private companies have expressed a reluctance to propose to 
their shareholders that they enter a company with a major state holding. This would be seen 
as  engendering weakness because of a perception that state companies can  lack  clarity on 
commercial  objectives,  sutTer  from  political  sensitivity  of decisions  and  have  insufficient 
speed  of reaction.  In  addition  it  can  be  the  case  that  state  owned  companies  are 
undercapitalised  compared  to  their  private  sector  counterparts.  Even  where  private 
companies are concerned, there can be a fear that without adequate safeguards, a concentrated 
minority  shareholding  could  be  used  to  exercise  effective  control  for  the  benefit  of that 
shareholder alone. 
The slow pace of integration and the problems relating to  the ditTerent corporate structures 
could lead to a scenario whereby a number of European aerospace companies form a sector-
specific  or  multi-sectoral  grouping  but  which  does  not  include  all  the  main  European 
aerospace producers and Member States, in other words a partial integration. 
2  Partial integration 
Such a scenario entails some of the benefits of consolidation, in particular economies of  scale 
and increased market base,  but would also single out one or more of the European aerospace 
companies thus running the risk of isolating them. 
These  companies  might  decide  to  enter  into  mergers  or alliances  with  US  or other  non-
European firms.  In certain sectors of the aerospace business  such alliances, transatlantic or 
otherwise,  could  entail  the  loss  of  managerial  control  and  of  control  over  defence 
requirements  and  ultimately  could  see  European  firms  becoming  subcontractors  or  niche 
players with a limited technological base.  This would not only split the  European industry 
but  could also call  into doubt the advantages of a strong European aerospace industry and, 
more  importantly,  the  question of political  priorities  in  terms of a strong and  independent 
technological  base  in  the  area  of  defence.  Moreover,  in  space  for  instance, 
telecommunications are a vital link in the global information society, so control of that sector 
has wider implications in terms of  cultural identity and access to information and services. 
Regardless of these  considerations,  even  such  partial  integration groupings  would  need  to 
address a number of issues such as efficient organisation and corporate structure. Experience 
with joint ventures has shown that they can be no more than a first step towards meeting the 
competitive demands facing the industry.  They have inherent structural weaknesses in speed 
of decision-making  and  component  sourcing,  and  they  do  not  eliminate  duplication  of 
facilities  or capabilities.  Moreover, joint ventures are  generally organised around a single 
product and thus cannot enjoy the benefits of  technological spin-otis or offsets. 
These inherent disadvantages and rigidities are also shared, albeit to a slightly lesser extent, 
by  the GIE (Groupement d'inten!t economique) structure used  by  Airbus  lndustrie amongst 
others.  Unless  such transnational  undertakings are able  to  adopt  more  agile  and  efficient 
corporate structures,  they  will  be  handicapped  in  raising  the  ever greater levels of finance 
needed and in  concluding the risk  and revenue sharing  partnerships which are essential  for 
spreading the risks associated with new product development and improving market access 
tor exports.  For example  Airbus  Industrie  plans  to  develop  a  new  very  large  passenger 
aircraft, the A3XX, whose enormous development costs (up to $10 billion)  will require the 
participation of risk-sharing partners from third European and non-European countries. 
In  terms  of organisation,  whatever  route  industry  decides  to  take  in  its  restructuring,  real 
progress  will  depend  on  any  transnational  European  aerospace  company  being  a  fully 
independent  commercial  entity,  responsible  for  programme  decisions  and  raising  its  own finance.  The companies and Member States involved have recognised that the GIE structure 
which was well suited to the start up phase of Airbus lndustrie, is no longer adapted to current 
needs and the business has to be transformed into a single corporate entity.  But although this 
objective  has  been  agreed  for  some  time,  a  great  deal  of detailed  work  remains  to  be 
accomplished.  Indeed even Trade Union representatives, fully  aware that this will  entail 
some degree of rationalisation, have urged the managerial level to accelerate the restructuring 
process. 
At  the  same time moves to  charge Airbus  with the  development of the FLA (Future large 
military  transport aircraft)  are  a  positive  first  step  in  creating a  large  integrated  European 
aerospace producer.  These tentative first  steps should be built upon by the incorporation of 
other activities and there should be  parallel developments in other parts of the  business to 
increase competitiveness by unlocking the full benefits of  size and scope mentioned above. 
If the aim is to create an integrated European aerospace industry, then it must be capable of 
maintaining industrial and technical capabilities in the Member States which will continue to 
he  the  primary  source  of support  for  the  foreseeable  future,  while  organising  itself on  a 
competitive and economic way.  This argues in favour of  the greatest degree of  multi-product 
and civil and military integration since this provides each Member State involved with the 
opportunity of having  an  economic and  efficient centre  of excellence  without  recourse  to 
narrow blinkered "juste-retour" policies within each system segment. 
3  The need for European groupings 
Given the specific factors  which apply to  aerospace, the full  benefits of restructuring would 
only be realised if all  the major aerospace producers and Member States are fully  involved. 
Thus it is also important that a way is  left open to bring in those companies which are unable 
to join from the outset. 
It is possible to imagine a variety of  configurations for European aerospace companies.  There 
could be a single enterprise for almost all aerospace activities, a company built around aircraft 
and another around electronics, or perhaps a separate company for space related activities or, 
indeed, any of  many ditJering combinations of sectors. 
E~IJ'f)les of 
NIJitl 
Sec:t.txiil 
G~ 
r..w  ""'• •- 1 MlltiiiY  H ~.  r.ut-v 
Ailllllft  1\i"r:l:ltr  TnllSflllrl  til fl111"~  1\lirrntr 
Aelospace and Defence 3.1  Sector-specific groupings 
Sector spccitic groupings  would have  the  advantage of bringing together companies  from 
different  Member  States,  thus  increasing  size,  but  would  also  entail  having  different 
companies in all the different sectors of production. The experience of Airbus has shown that 
even within a single sector, only if the current fragmented structures can be  superseded by 
larger undertakings which are unimpeded by individual policies based on national borders can 
the European aerospace industry hope to remain competitive. 
However,  whil~ sector-specific groupings might be appropriate for certain segments, in most 
other areas of the aerospace industry, one can wonder whether  sector-specific groupings can 
provide sufficient scale and capabilities to compete in the world market. The particularities of 
the  aerospace  market  demand  a  market  base,  a  know-how  and  financial  and  industrial 
capabilities such that  the  balance of advantage  lies  with the  giant  US  producers  currently 
present on the market with a hroad range of aerospace products. 
A multi-sectoral Europe<m dimension, on the other hand, would encourage the development 
of competitivt: new products hy allowing investment at a European scale not feasible for any 
single tirm or Member State. nor probably for  most sector-specific groupings, and enable the 
creation of industrial structures capable of efficient operations and at an economic scale.  It 
could also give rise  to  a  regulatory environment that encouraged competitive products and 
services to  be  created and  lead to  the development of European standards which make  tor 
efficient co-operation. 
3.2  Multi-sectoral groupings 
Industry and governments have to  use their limited resources for  RTD as a basis for as many 
products as possibk.  One of the reasons why the most successful firms are present in  many 
areas  is  that  each  RTD  action  has  potential  applications  in  2  or  3  branches  of activity. 
Another is to allow companies to take advantage of benefits of scope where economies can b..: 
realised from applying similar techniques and incorporating the same basic elements across a 
number of  closely related products. 
Only  industry  itself can  evaluate these  benefits  but  it  is  instructive  to  note  that  in  recent 
merger cases in the I IS, the benetits in terms of  cost reductions accruing to the merging tirms 
have been estimated to be worth several billion dollars. 
In most branches of  aerospace there is a close relationship between the civil and military sides 
of the business.  Technologies, procedures, components and equipment are often identical or 
nearly  identical  in  civil  and  military  applications.  From  a  business  viewpoint,  the 
combination  of  civil  and  military  activities  also  helps  to  ovt::rcome  cyclical  market 
fluctuations and spreads exposure to risks. 
Another  important  issue  in  civil/military  intt:gration  arises  out  of the  role  of offsets  in 
aerospace trade.  Although limited by  international agreements with respect to  civil aircraft, 
the ability to  conclude direct and indirect offset arrangements can be a determining factor in 
gaining access to certain foreign markets.  Such offsets, including bundled sales of a range of 
civil and military aerospace products arc facilitated in practical terms by  tlcxible and  fully-
integrated civil/military aerospace companies. 
12 The complexity of th~ links  between the  difkrcnt aerospace sectors  ts  shown graphically 
below. 
Most  aerospace  companies  have  major  dt.:lcnce  interests  and  are  reliant  on  government 
procuremmt and technology funding.  However while some of the major European aerospace 
companies  arc  striving  to  r~ducc  their  depem.lcncc  on  domestic  defence-procurement 
contracts the US companies appear to  ht.:  doing the opposite.  One of the main stated reasons 
for the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger was the wish to  combine the military capabilities 
of MDC with the civil capabilities of Hoeing. The advantages of  a merger such as this are that 
the possibilities for  flexible pricing, bundled sales, and allowing the new merged company to 
benefit from the Department of Delence's procurement contracts arc increased. 
The nature of the aerospace market is such that in many, though not all, sectors it will only be 
possible fi)r  one entity to  remain viable in  Europe.  ror example. many commentators have 
suggested that in  the medium to long term there is  probably only room tor one major civil-
military producer of airframes in  Europe.  Such a suggestion need not necessarily give rise to 
competition problems  il~ as was the case with the Messier-Dowty landing gear merger, there 
is a fully functioning global market with strong t()reign competitors. 
In  the  case of detl:!ncc  markets which do  not  function  globally  for  political  reasons, since 
Member States have already shown a willingness to accept a situation at national level where 
there is only one producer, this could also be envisaged at European level.  In any event some 
kind of n:krcnce framework  could he  provided  hy  lIS competition in  export markets and 
wmpetition would be  reintroduced ira strong  a  and more uni tied defence market in  Europe 
could  help  persuade  the  US  to  open  their  market  and  allow  the  development  of a  true 
transatlantic market in  deft~ncc goods. 
European transnational  restructuring  is  aln:ady  beginning  in  some business sectors through 
the creation of companies like  Mcssier-Dowty, Matra-BAe Dynamics, Eurocopter and Matra 
Marconi Space.  llowever market imperatives of technological cross-fertilisation, economies 
of scale and scope, synergy and risk-balancing argue strongly in  favour of the development of 
European companies producing a broad rangl: of  aerospace products. 
IJ 3.3  Overall integrated grouping 
It could be said that since multi-sectoral groupings would not benefit fully from the synergies 
between all  the  different  sectors of the  aerospace  industry,  another option  for  a  European 
grouping is a scenario where all the companies from all Member States consolidate into one 
single European Aerospace company. 
One  could  imagine  that  in  such  a  scenario  all  the  benefits  of consolidation  would  be 
magnified.  Moreover  while  it  must  be  highlighted  that  even  the  largest  US  aerospace 
companies are  not so disparately  multi-sectoral  as  a  single  European  Aerospace company 
would  be if it  were  to  exist,  it  must also  be  stressed that such  a  company  would  still  be 
smaller than Boeing, the largest US competitor. 
Nonetheless, it must also be recognised that the problems associated with restructuring would 
be  amplified  to  such an  extent that  a  swift transition  from  today's situation  to  an  overall 
integrated European aerospace grouping is not very realistic. Thus in the short term, the most 
promising way forward appears to be through multi-sectoral groupings. 
IV.  PRIORITIES 
1  Accelerate restructuring 
The need for restructuring is  clear and urgent, regardless of which scenario is  deemed most 
appropriate.  It is also unquestionable that the present pace of integration is too slow and that 
it  is  necessary  to  press  ahead  beginning  with  the  already  agreed  conversion  of Airbus 
Industrie to  a single corporate entity.  The extra difficulties of restructuring in  the defence 
sector should not serve as a pretext for delaying restructuring in the civil sector. 
The  need  for  Europe-wide consolidation  in  the  field  of aerospace  and  the  reality  that  no 
Member State can any longer retain complete autonomy in its aerospace capability have to be 
acknowledged through the acceptance of true interdependence within Europe in the interest of 
the continued well-being of the  European aerospace industry as a whole.  This restructuring 
must also take into account the necessary interdependence between aeronautics and space and 
the strong technological  links with other sectors.  The pursuit of competitiveness must also 
encompass  the  numerous  subcontractors  of the  aerospace  sector,  especially  SME's which 
play a major role in job creation and in the development and diffusion of technologies. 
Although the primary responsibility for restructuring falls on industry itself, aerospace is and 
will  remain  one  of the  most  politically  sensitive  industries.  The  role  of governments  is 
crucial for restructuring and it is  essential that the Member States take all  practical steps to 
encourage and assist the creation of truly European companies. Even where there is no direct 
state  shareholding,  state  influence  arises  from  its  role  of major  client,  tinancer  of RTD, 
provider of launch aid, export control authority, certification agency and so forth. 
Member  States  can  act  by  adapting  their  support  structures  to  facilitate  restructuring. 
Governments  must  be  willing  to  balance  a  narrow  view  of national  sovereignty  with  the 
overriding objective of industrial competitiveness.  Those Member States which have a direct 
shareholding in aerospace companies must adapt that shareholding or manage it in such a way 
that  the  restructuring  process  can  advance.  Industry  must  be  given  sufficient  commercial 
freedom and support to  make the required changes.  The management of enterprises must be 
guaranteed maximum commercial flexibility  in  operational terms.  This is  not to  negate the 
1--l vital role of governments but to propose that this role be exercised in ways that do not hinder, 
but promote the necessary changes. 
Bearing in  mind the  possibilities permitted by  the  Community framework  for  state aid  for 
research and development, Member States should also be ready to judge launch aid and RTD 
support decisions against the overall  impact on the  European aerospace industry as  well as 
against  national  technological  and  employment  benefits  taking  into  account  the  global 
dimension  of a  large  part  of this  industry.  Co-ordination  of RTD  on  both  national  and 
Community level will therefore be essential and, given the existence of a number of  dedicated 
aeronautical  research  programmes  and  facilities,  new  strategic  planning  and  management 
functions,  including  technology  foresight,  which  take  account  of existing  co-operative 
arrangements, will  have to  be  developed so as  to  support an integrated European approach. 
Such  co-operation  will  stimulate  synergy  between  applied  and  fundamental  research,  and 
dual-usc technologies and will increase the impact at all levels of  the supply chain. 
2  Accompanying measures 
The diversity of the  critical success factors  means  that no  single  initiative can address  the 
challenge  of building  tor  the  future  - many  separate,  phased  and  related  actions  will  be 
needed to accompany the  industry restructuring if success is  to  be  achieved.  Nonetheless it 
must  be  stressed  that  without  restructuring,  the  impact of any  public  measures  would  be 
severely  limited.  However,  if industry  is  willing to  take  the  difficult decisions  which the 
market  demands,  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  should  also  be  ready  to  make 
further efforts in areas such as the following, which are of  great importance for aerospace. 
RTD  support  tor  aeronautics  which  has  been  increasing  since  the  2nd  framework 
programme,  should  continue  to  be  a  major  factor  contributing  to  the  co-operation  both 
between  individual  aeronautics  firms  and  between  the  different  sectors of the  industry  -
airframers. engine producers and equipment suppliers.  In the 5th framework programme, the 
Community  research  effort  should  be  centred  around  the  proposed  key  action  "New 
Perspectives in  Aeronautics", while the industry will also benefit from other FP5  activities, 
e.g. the creation of a user-friendly information society, generic activities for the development 
and  support to  research  infrastructures, activities  in  favour of SME's, the  improvement of 
human  potential  and  international  co-operation.  In  line  with the  recommendations of the 
"New generation aircraft" Task Force. the  research activities should focus  on the strategic 
objectives  identified  at  European  level  including  technology  integrator  platforms  at  the 
required  scale  supporting  the  competitiveness  of  the  aeronautics  industry  and  the 
improvement of the air transport system, e.g.  environmental, safety and operational factors 
which are also  key  elements for competitiveness. Also in the domain of space technologies 
and space applications the Commission will ensure a coherent approach in  its RTD actions 
under  the  different  specific  programmes of the  5th  Framework  Programme,  as  well  as  a 
reinforced co-ordination with the national space agencies' and the European Space Agency's 
programmes 
Defence procurement issues should be  addressed as  a matter of priority.  With escalating 
costs  and  budget  restrictions,  ever  fewer  new  programmes  will  be  launched  but  the 
programmes will  be of such importance and last so long that they will effectively structure 
the  industry  tor the next 30 years or so.  The Commission proposed the establishment of a 
European  defence  procurement  regime  which  could  lead  to  the  creation  of a  European 
domestic  defence  market  and  harmonisation  of procurement  requirements,  schedules  and 
15 procedures  in  its  1996  communication  on  the  Defence-related  industries.  This  must  be 
accompanied by  the  necessary harmonisation of technical and operational specitication.s  by 
the appropriate bodies. 
The  new Article  J.7  on  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  in  the  draft  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam  makes  a  special  reference  to  the  field  of armaments.  This  creates  further 
possibilities for new initiatives and actions in support of  this process. 
The  report  of the  "Davignon  Group"  on  the  European  Company  Statute  opens  new 
perspectives for  political agreement on employee involvement in  the European Company in 
the months ahead.  Ifthis hurdle can be overcome it could lead the way to  the adoption of the 
Statute by the accelerated procedure foreseen in the Single Market Action Plan agreed at the 
Amsterdam European Council of the European Union.  This restructuring tool should be put 
at the disposal of the aerospace industry as an efficient means of blending the European and 
national identities of  restructured companies. 
Another subject of high priority is  the creation of a European Aviation Safety Authority 
that  would  complement  the  single  market  by  the  establishment  of a  single  legislative 
framework and a single certification process for all aeronautical products.  This will not only 
reduce the regulatory cost borne by the European industry but also facilitate  the world wide 
promotion of European safety standards.  It is therefore essential that the Council acts quickly 
on the Commission recommendation for  a Council Decision authorising the  Commission to 
start negotiations with a view to  establishing a European organisation responsible  tor civil 
aviation safety. 3. 
It is also recognised that diminishing airspace congestion and increasing the efficiency of air 
traffic  management will  contribute  to  expanding  the  air  transport  market  and  ensure  a 
sustainable  growth  to  the  manufacturing  industry.  In  this  spirit  the  strengthening  of 
EUROCONTROL and the adhesion of the Community to  this organisation, as proposed by 
the  Commission will  contribute  to  the  acceleration  of the  development of new  tools  and 
concepts, giving a European edge in this field. 
As far as satellite navigation is concerned, the Commission will bring forward an action plan 
for a European approach to the development of a global satellite navigation system based on 
public-private partnership. 
In order to  maximise the benefit of the  internal market and in  view of the current tendency 
worJd-wide  and  in  the  US  to  move  from  military  to  civil  standards,  it  is  of the  utmost 
importance tor Europe to strengthen its own standardisation activity in  aerospace so as  to 
avoid a de facto US monopoly. 
•  External trade aspects: 
International  rules  exist  both  at  the  multilateral  as  well  as  the  bilateral  level  to  limit  the 
distortion of trade due to government intervention especially with regard  to  subsidies.  The 
1992  EU-US  bilateral  Agreement  on  trade  in  large  civil  Aircraft  is  based  on  a  trade-off 
between limiting direct (development) support, which is mainly granted on the European side, 
and  limits  on  indirect  (RTD)  support  granted  by  the  US  government.  However,  the 
implementation of the Agreement by  the  US  has been heavily criticised by  the  EU  and  its 
industry.  In  March 1997, the Commission, with the support of the Member States and the 
industry,  launched a review of the agreement. This process, which has not  been concluded 
yet, has to be reviewed in the light of the new situation created by  the Boeing/McDonnell-
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16 Douglas merger and of the conditions imposed by the Commission's merger decision some of 
which are of the same type as  issues addressed under the review process.  Furthermore the 
Commission will remain vigilant with regard to any market access problems which may arise 
in  the  aerospace  sector  of third  countries.  If necessary,  in  close  co-operation  with  the 
Member States,  this  includes taking action  under the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
WTO. 
As  far as export promotion is concerned, the Commission is  fully aware of the importance 
of ensuring that aerospace purchasing decisions are made on the basis of fair and objective, 
commercial and technological factors and that European products receive due consideration. 
Accordingly the  Commission, working in  close co-operation with the  Member States, will 
respond  positively  to  industry  requests  for  action in  line  with the  above position and  will 
itself ensure  that  the  above  message  is  conveyed  to  all  relevant  authorities  wherever and 
whenever appropriate. 
V  CONCLUSION 
Sustaining growth and  competitiveness against increasingly intense world competition will 
not be achieved by a single factor nor in a single Member State.  In the European context it 
will require a number of separate objectives to be secured.  Some of these will be secured at 
the level of individual firms.  Their relative success or failure will determine their growth and 
survival.  Nothing accomplished at a European level can substitute for excellence at the level 
of the firm.  But individual firms cannot create the entire picture - even excellence across all 
the  firms  currently  engaged  in  aerospace  will  not  be  enough.  Over  and  above  superior 
performance by  individual  firms,  Europe  will  need  to  provide the  context in  which  these 
firms can flourish in the massive collaborative endeavours which constitute modem aerospace 
products and the myriad of  systems and supporting services which they need. 
European aerospace  in  the next century  will,  however, depend upon a  vision not only for 
aerospace but for Europe; yet time is not on Europe's side.  The integration of action by the 
industry, Member States and the European Union in the remaining years of this decade will 
decide  whether these  visions can be  realised  in  the  next century.  Continued inaction will 
probably condemn the European aerospace industry to a lingering death. 
The Council is therefore invited to support the thrust of  this Communication and to recognise 
the  urgency  of restructuring  of the  European  aerospace  industry.  The  Council  and  the 
Member States are also  invited to  support the  required Community actions and to  take the 
other appropriate initiatives needed to facilitate and encourage this process of  restructuring. 
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